The paper reports a perceptual asymmetry for the two diagonals that is related to gender such that females prefer the diagonal spanning from top-right to bottom left (/) while males the opposite one (''). This relationship is observed in a variety of tasks: Aesthetic judgment of paintings, spotting differences between two paintings, and visual search for a tilted line among similarly tilted distractors. The paper does not provide an explanation of the relationship between this asymmetry and gender but rules out several potential mediating factors, such as eye dominance, head tilt, handedness, and hemispheric differences. At the same time, the paper does outline the scope of the phenomenon: The asymmetry is found both for meaningful and for meaningless stimuli and both at brief and at extended presentation. Moreover, the asymmetry is found related to the tilt of the visual elements that require processing not to their location in the visual field.

A number of studies, most notably Cr×mer and McLean (1985, 1988), have shown that in Harsanyi type spaces of a fixed finite size, it is generically possible to design mechanisms that extract all the surplus  from players, and as a consequence, implement any outcome as if the players' private information  were commonly known. In contrast, we show that within the set of common priors on the universal type  space, the subset of priors that permit the extraction of the players' full surplus is shy. Shyness is a  notion of smallness for convex subsets of infinite-dimensional topological vector spaces (in our case,  the set of common priors), which generalizes the usual notion of zero Lebesgue measure in  finite-dimensional spaces.

We introduce an extension of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and construct, by an elabo- ration on a voting paradox, a superadditive four-person nontransferable utility game whose extended bargaining set is empty. It is shown that this extension constitutes an upper hemi- continuous correspondence. We conclude that the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-levelled superadditive NTU game may be empty.

Asymptotic results for the problem of optimal two choice stopping on an n elementlong i.i.d. sequence Xn, . . . ,X1 have previously been obtained for two of the threedomains of attraction. An asymptotic result is proved for the exponential distribution,a representative from the remaining, Type I domain, and it is conjectured that thesame behavior obtains for all Type I distributions.

We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better informed player can communicate some or all of his information with the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs, and contrast these with the communication equilibrium payoffs, which by definition entail no communication costs.

Contrary to the conventional assumption that individuals maximize payoffs, robust experimental studies show that individuals who face repeated choices involving probabilistic costs and benefits often make sub-optimal decisions by applying the strategy of "probability matching." The following study, by integrating this literature with the traditional models of law and economics, and through experimental illustration, presents the possible effects of probability matching in the legal context. The paper also explores how probability matching can guide policy making.

We offer a case-study in irrationality, showing that even in a high stakes, deliberate context, highly intelligent professionals may adopt dominated practices. Multiple-choice tests (MCTs) enjoy many advantages that made them popular tools in educational and psychological measurement. But they suffer from the so-called guessing problem: test-makers cannot distinguish lucky guesses from answers based on knowledge. One way professional test-makers have dealt with this problem is by attempting to lower the incentive to guess, through penalizing errors (called formula scoring). Another is to rid tests of various cues (e.g., a preponderance of correct answers in middle positions) that might help testwise test-takers guess at better than chance odds. Key balancing is the strategy test-takers adopted for ridding tests of positional biases. We show that formula scoring and key balancing, though widespread and intuitively appealing, are in fact "irrational" practices. They do not dispose of the guessing problem and are fraught with problems of their own. Yet they persist, even in the presence of more rational alternatives: Number right scoring is superior to formula scoring, and key randomization is superior to key balancing.

An extension of Condorcet's paradox by McGarvey (1953) asserts that for every asymmetric relation R on a finite set of candidates there is a strict-preferences voter profile that has the relation R as its strict simple majority relation. We prove that McGarvey's theorem can be extended to arbitrary neutral monotone social welfare functions which can be described by a strong simple game G if the voting power of each individual, measured by the it Shapley-Shubik power index, is sufficiently small. Our proof is based on an extension to another classic result concerning the majority rule. Condorcet studied an election between two candidates in which the voters' choices are random and independent and the probability of a voter choosing the first candidate is p > 1/2. Condorcet's Jury Theorem asserts that if the number of voters tends to infinity then the probability that the first candidate will be elected tends to one. We prove that this assertion extends to a sequence of arbitrary monotone strong simple games if and only if the maximum voting power for all individuals tends to zero.

In this paper we consider dynamic processes, in repeated games, that are subject to the natural informational restriction of uncoupledness. We study the almost sure convergence to Nash equilibria, and present a number of possibility and impossibility results. Basically, we show that if in addition to random moves some recall is introduced, then successful search procedures that are uncoupled can be devised. In particular, to get almost sure convergence to pure Nash equilibria when these exist, it suffices to recall the last two periods of play.

This paper proposes an explanation of merger waves based on the interaction between competitive pressure and irreversibility of mergers in an uncertain environment. A set of acquirers compete over time for scarce targets. At each point in time, an acquirer can either postpone a takeover attempt, or raid immediately. By postponing the takeover attempt, an acquirer may gain from more favorable future market conditions, but runs the risk of being preempted by rivals. First, a complete information model is considered, and it is shown that the above tradeoff leads to a continuum of subgame perfect equilibria in monotone strategies that are strictly Pareto ranked. All these equilibria share the feature that all acquirers rush simultaneously in merger waves. The model is then extended to a dynamic global game by introducing slightly noisy private information about merger profitability. This game is shown to have a unique Markov perfect Bayesian equilibrium in monotone strategies, and the timing of the merger wave can thus be predicted. Last, the comparative dynamics predictions of the model are related to stylized facts.

In most industries, ranging from information systems development to construction, an overwhelming proportion of projects are delayed beyond estimated completion time. This fact constitutes somewhat of a puzzle for existing theory. The present paper studies project delays and optimal contracts under moral hazard in a setting with time to build. Within this setup, project delays are found to be most likelyto happen at early stages of development, and intimately connected to the degree ofcommitment of the procurer and the class of contracts that can be enforced. The firstbest,optimal spot contracting and optimal long-term contract scenarios are analyzed, aswell as commonly encountered additional constraints on the long-term contract.

It is commonly accepted that face-to-face communication induces cooperation. The experiment disentangles communication and social effect (replication of Roth, 1995) and examines the components of the social effect with the help of unilateral communication. Results suggest that separate processes, both of a strategic and of an affective-social nature may induce cooperative outcomes in ultimatum bargaining with pre-play communication, depending on the communication protocol. Unilateral communication is found to have weaker effects than bilateral communication, and affects especially the recipient of the communication.

Three values for non-transferable utility games – the Harsanyi NTU-value, the Shapley NTU-value, and the Maschler-Owen consistent NTU-value – are compared in a simple example.

The Maschler-Owen consistent value for non-transferable utility games is axiomatized, by means of a marginality axiom.

Behavior in dynamic competitive situations requires decision makers to evaluate their own as well as their competitors positions. This paper uses data from a realistic competitive risk taking setting, Jeopardy s Tournament of Champions, to test whether individual players choose the strategic best response in making their betting decisions. The analyses show that the percentage of players choosing the strategic best response is very low, a rather surprising finding because the Tournament of Champions is contested by the very best and most experienced players of the Jeopardy game. We conjecture that performance aspiration and survival targets guide risk-taking behavior in competitive situations. Furthermore, in situations where decisions are made under pressure, contestants tend to focus on one target while ignoring alternative targets and the choices that are available to their competitors. This may lead them to select inferior competitive strategies.

The asymptotic value, introduced by Kannai in 1966, is an asymptotic approach to the notion of the Shapley value for games with infinitely many players. A vector measure game is a game v where the worth v(S) of a coalition S is a function f of ¼(S) where ¼ is a vector measure. Special classes of vector measure games are the weighted majority games and the two-house weighted majority games where a two-house weighted majority game is a game in which a coalition is winning if and only if it is winning in two given weighted majority games. All weighted majority games have an asymptotic value. However, not all two-house weighted majority games have an asymptotic value. In this paper we prove that the existence of infinitely many atoms with sufficient variety suffice for the existence of the asymptotic value in a general class of nonsmooth vector measure games that includes in particular two-house weighted majority games.

Gradual bargaining is represented by an agenda: a family of increasing sets of joint utilities, parameterized by time. A solution for gradual bargaining specifies an agreement at each time. We axiomatize an ordinal solution, i.e., one that is covariant with order-preserving transformations of utility. It can be viewed as the limit of a step-by-step bargaining in which the agreement of the last negotiation becomes the disagreement point for the next. The stepwise agreements may follow the Nash solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution or many others.

When individuals choose from whatever alternatives available to them the one that maximizes their utility then it is always desirable that the government provide them with as many alternatives as possible. Individuals, however, do not always choose what is best for them and their mistakes may be exacerbated by the availability of options. We analyze self-selection models, when individuals know more about themselves than it is possible for governments to know, and show that it may be socially optimal to limit and sometimes to eliminate individual choice. As an example, we apply Luce s (1959) model of random choice to a work-retirement decision model and show that the optimal provision of choice is positively related to the degree of heterogeneity in the population and that even with very small degrees of non-rationality it may be optimal not to provide individuals any choice.

When the amount of information to be dealt with exceeds people s short-term memory capacity, they must resort to the sampling of information. In the present study we show that, under conditions of cognitive overload (which could result from decision-making under stress, time constraints or information abundance), individuals exhibit systematic differences in estimating variance. Moreover, these differences critically depend on the format of the evidence presented: Variance is downward attenuated when information is presented analogically, but amplified when it is presented numerically. These distortions in the perception of variance affect individuals pricing of risky alternatives. We suggest that these results may help to explain economic anomalies, such as excess trading in financial markets. We also point out possibilities for manipulating the perception of variability and normative implications concerning the presentation of information on the variance of phenomena.