2004
Aumann, R. J., & Furstenberg, H. . (2004).
Findings of the Committee to Investigate the Gans-Inbal Results on Equidistant Letter Sequences in Genesis.
Discussion Papers. presented at the 6. Retrieved from
/files/dp364.1.pdf Publisher's VersionAbstractIn 1996, a committee was formed to examine the results that had been reported by H.J. Gans regarding the existence of "encoded" text in the bible foretelling events that took place many years after the Bible was written. The committee performed two additional tests in the spirit of the Gans experiments. Both tests failed to confirmed the existence of the putative code.
Larry Goldstein, Y. R. . (2004).
Functional BRK Inequalities, and Their Duals, with Applications.
Discussion Papers. presented at the 11, Journal of Theoretical Probability 20, 275-293 (2007). Retrieved from
/files/ Revision of September 12 2015.pdf, dp374.pdf Publisher's VersionAbstractThe inequality conjectured by van den Berg and Kesten in [9], and proved by Reimerin [6], states that for A and B events on S, a product of finitely many finite sets, and P any product measure on S, P(A¿B) P(A)P(B), where A¿B are the elementary events which lie in both A and B for `disjoint reasons.' This inequality on events is the special case, for indicator functions, of the inequalityhaving the following formulation. Let X be a random vector with n independent components, each in some space Si (such as„d), and set S = ˆni=1Si. Say that the function f : S †’„depends on K Š‚ 1,...,n if f(x) = f(y) whenever xi = yi for all i ˆˆ K. Then for any given finite or countable collections of non-negative real valued functions f$\pm$$\pm$ˆˆA, g²²ˆˆB on S which depend on K$\pm$ and L² respectively,EsupK$\pm$ˆ\copyrightL²=ˆłdots} f$\pm$(X) g²(X) Esup f$\pm$(X) Esup g²(X). Related formulations, and functional versions of the dual inequality on events by Kahn,Saks, and Smyth [4], are also considered. Applications include order statistics, assignment problems, and paths in random graphs.
Neeman, O. M., & Zvika, . (2004).
Inspection in Markets for Experience Goods.
Discussion Papers. presented at the 2. Retrieved from
/files/db349.pdf Publisher's VersionAbstractWe consider a simple dynamic "collective reputation" model of a market for an experience good into'' which we introduce imperfect quality inspections. In each period two markets operate: a prime market'' for sellers with a good reputation, and a regular market for all other sellers. In every period, the quality of produced goods is inspected, and producers who have been found to produce low quality goods are barred from selling in the prime market in the next period. We demonstrate that the average quality of the good in both markets may decrease as inspection technology improves. A few applications of the model are discussed.
Bar-Hillel, A. M., & Maya, . (2004).
Loss Aversion and Status-Quo Label Bias.
Discussion Papers. presented at the 11, Social Cognition, 2010, Vol. 28, No. 2, Pp. 192-206. Retrieved from
/files/ SQLB-373.pdf Publisher's VersionAbstractIt has been noted and demonstrated that people are reluctant to make changes in their current state (called the status quo bias, Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988), and to trade objects they own (called the endowment effect, Thaler, 1980). This reluctance has been explained by a combination of loss aversion and reference dependence which causes the status quo to appear better than its alternative, ceteris paribus. In the present study, respondents were asked to rate the attractiveness of various policies, and to list their pros and cons. We find that just labeling some state of affairs status quo enhances its rating (which we call the status quo label bias); namely, a policy seemed more attractive to respondents who thought it is the status quo than to those who did not. An analysis of the listed pros and cons provides evidence that a model of the balance of a policy's pros and cons is a good predictor of that policy's attractiveness. Rendering the pros and cons in terms of losses and gains provides evidence that losses do, indeed, loom larger than gains. When put together, our results provide an empirical grounding for the loss aversion explanation of the status quo bias.
David Assaf, L. G., & Samuel-Cahn, E. . (2004).
Maximizing Expected Value with Two Stage Stopping Rules.
Discussion Papers. presented at the 3, Random Walks, Sequential Analysis and Related Topics, Chao Agnes Hsiung, Zhiliang Ying and Cun-Hui Zhang, Eds. World Scientific, Singapore (2006), 3-27. Retrieved from
/files/db351.pdf Publisher's VersionAbstractLet Xn, ¦,X1 be i.i.d. random variables with distribution function F and finite expectation. A statistician, knowing F, observes the X values sequentially and is given two chances to choose X's using stopping rules. The statistician's goal is to select a value of X as large as possible. Let Vn2 equal the expectation of the larger of the two values chosen by the statistician when proceeding optimally. We obtain the asymptotic behavior of the sequence Vn2 for a large class of F's belonging to the domain of attraction (for the maximum) D(GII''$\pm$), where GII''$\pm$ (x) = exp(-x-''$\pm$)''(x > 0) with$\pm$ > 1. The results are compared with those for the asymptotic behavior of the classical one choice value sequence Vn1, as well as with the ""prophet value"" sequence E(maxXn, ¦,X1), and indicate that substantial improvement is obtained when given two chances to stop, rather than one.
Judith Avrahami, T. A., & Weiss-Chasum, D. . (2004).
Mysteries of the Diagonal: Gender-Related Perceptual Asymmetries, The.
Discussion Papers. presented at the 2, Perception & Psychophysics (In Press). Retrieved from
/files/db348.pdf Publisher's VersionAbstractThe paper reports a perceptual asymmetry for the two diagonals that is related to gender such that females prefer the diagonal spanning from top-right to bottom left (/) while males the opposite one (''). This relationship is observed in a variety of tasks: Aesthetic judgment of paintings, spotting differences between two paintings, and visual search for a tilted line among similarly tilted distractors. The paper does not provide an explanation of the relationship between this asymmetry and gender but rules out several potential mediating factors, such as eye dominance, head tilt, handedness, and hemispheric differences. At the same time, the paper does outline the scope of the phenomenon: The asymmetry is found both for meaningful and for meaningless stimuli and both at brief and at extended presentation. Moreover, the asymmetry is found related to the tilt of the visual elements that require processing not to their location in the visual field.
Neeman, A. H., & Zvika, . (2004).
On the Generic (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design.
Discussion Papers. presented at the 2, Econometrica 74 (2006), 213-233. Retrieved from
/files/dp350.pdf Publisher's VersionAbstractA number of studies, most notably Cr×mer and McLean (1985, 1988), have shown that in Harsanyi type spaces of a fixed finite size, it is generically possible to design mechanisms that extract all the surplus from players, and as a consequence, implement any outcome as if the players' private information were commonly known. In contrast, we show that within the set of common priors on the universal type space, the subset of priors that permit the extraction of the players' full surplus is shy. Shyness is a notion of smallness for convex subsets of infinite-dimensional topological vector spaces (in our case, the set of common priors), which generalizes the usual notion of zero Lebesgue measure in finite-dimensional spaces.
Sudholter, B. P., & Peter, . (2004).
On the Non-Emptiness of the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set.
Discussion Papers. presented at the 5, Journal of Mathematical Economics 41 (2005), 1060-1068. Retrieved from
/files/dp360.pdf Publisher's VersionAbstractWe introduce an extension of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and construct, by an elabo- ration on a voting paradox, a superadditive four-person nontransferable utility game whose extended bargaining set is empty. It is shown that this extension constitutes an upper hemi- continuous correspondence. We conclude that the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-levelled superadditive NTU game may be empty.
Samuel-Cahn, L. G., & Ester, . (2004).
Optimal Two Choice Stopping on an Exponential Sequence.
Discussion Papers. presented at the 11, Sequential Analysis 25 (2006), 351-363. Retrieved from
/files/dp375.pdf Publisher's VersionAbstractAsymptotic results for the problem of optimal two choice stopping on an n elementlong i.i.d. sequence Xn, . . . ,X1 have previously been obtained for two of the threedomains of attraction. An asymptotic result is proved for the exponential distribution,a representative from the remaining, Type I domain, and it is conjectured that thesame behavior obtains for all Type I distributions.
Olivier Gossner, P. H., & Neyman, A. . (2004).
Optimal Use of Communication Resources.
Discussion Papers. presented at the 12. Retrieved from
/files/dp377.pdf Publisher's VersionAbstractWe study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better informed player can communicate some or all of his information with the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs, and contrast these with the communication equilibrium payoffs, which by definition entail no communication costs.
Yaari, W. G. ¼th, & E., M. . (2004).
Parity, Sympathy, and Reciprocity.
Discussion Papers. presented at the 3. Retrieved from
/files/dp354.pdf Publisher's Version Harel, E. G., & Alon, . (2004).
Probability Matching and the Law: A Behavioral Challenge to Law & Economics.
Discussion Papers. presented at the 7. Retrieved from
/files/dp368.pdf Publisher's VersionAbstractContrary to the conventional assumption that individuals maximize payoffs, robust experimental studies show that individuals who face repeated choices involving probabilistic costs and benefits often make sub-optimal decisions by applying the strategy of "probability matching." The following study, by integrating this literature with the traditional models of law and economics, and through experimental illustration, presents the possible effects of probability matching in the legal context. The paper also explores how probability matching can guide policy making.
Maya Bar-Hillel, D. B., & Attali, Y. . (2004).
Scoring and Keying Multiple Choice Tests: A Case Study in Irrationality.
Discussion Papers. presented at the 9, Mind and Society 4 (2005), 3-12. Retrieved from
/files/dp370.pdf Publisher's VersionAbstractWe offer a case-study in irrationality, showing that even in a high stakes, deliberate context, highly intelligent professionals may adopt dominated practices. Multiple-choice tests (MCTs) enjoy many advantages that made them popular tools in educational and psychological measurement. But they suffer from the so-called guessing problem: test-makers cannot distinguish lucky guesses from answers based on knowledge. One way professional test-makers have dealt with this problem is by attempting to lower the incentive to guess, through penalizing errors (called formula scoring). Another is to rid tests of various cues (e.g., a preponderance of correct answers in middle positions) that might help testwise test-takers guess at better than chance odds. Key balancing is the strategy test-takers adopted for ridding tests of positional biases. We show that formula scoring and key balancing, though widespread and intuitively appealing, are in fact "irrational" practices. They do not dispose of the guessing problem and are fraught with problems of their own. Yet they persist, even in the presence of more rational alternatives: Number right scoring is superior to formula scoring, and key randomization is superior to key balancing.
Kalai, G. . (2004).
Social Indeterminacy.
Discussion Papers. presented at the 6, Econometrica 72 (2004), 1565-1581. Retrieved from
/files/dp362.pdf Publisher's VersionAbstractAn extension of Condorcet's paradox by McGarvey (1953) asserts that for every asymmetric relation R on a finite set of candidates there is a strict-preferences voter profile that has the relation R as its strict simple majority relation. We prove that McGarvey's theorem can be extended to arbitrary neutral monotone social welfare functions which can be described by a strong simple game G if the voting power of each individual, measured by the it Shapley-Shubik power index, is sufficiently small. Our proof is based on an extension to another classic result concerning the majority rule. Condorcet studied an election between two candidates in which the voters' choices are random and independent and the probability of a voter choosing the first candidate is p > 1/2. Condorcet's Jury Theorem asserts that if the number of voters tends to infinity then the probability that the first candidate will be elected tends to one. We prove that this assertion extends to a sequence of arbitrary monotone strong simple games if and only if the maximum voting power for all individuals tends to zero.
Mas-Colell, S. H., & Andreu, . (2004).
Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium.
Discussion Papers. presented at the 9, Games and Economic Behavior 57 (2006), 286-303. Retrieved from
/files/ uncoupl-st.html Publisher's VersionAbstractIn this paper we consider dynamic processes, in repeated games, that are subject to the natural informational restriction of uncoupledness. We study the almost sure convergence to Nash equilibria, and present a number of possibility and impossibility results. Basically, we show that if in addition to random moves some recall is introduced, then successful search procedures that are uncoupled can be devised. In particular, to get almost sure convergence to pure Nash equilibria when these exist, it suffices to recall the last two periods of play.
Toxvaerd, F. . (2004).
Strategic Merger Waves: A Theory of Musical Chairs.
Discussion Papers. presented at the 5. Retrieved from
/files/dp359.pdf Publisher's VersionAbstractThis paper proposes an explanation of merger waves based on the interaction between competitive pressure and irreversibility of mergers in an uncertain environment. A set of acquirers compete over time for scarce targets. At each point in time, an acquirer can either postpone a takeover attempt, or raid immediately. By postponing the takeover attempt, an acquirer may gain from more favorable future market conditions, but runs the risk of being preempted by rivals. First, a complete information model is considered, and it is shown that the above tradeoff leads to a continuum of subgame perfect equilibria in monotone strategies that are strictly Pareto ranked. All these equilibria share the feature that all acquirers rush simultaneously in merger waves. The model is then extended to a dynamic global game by introducing slightly noisy private information about merger profitability. This game is shown to have a unique Markov perfect Bayesian equilibrium in monotone strategies, and the timing of the merger wave can thus be predicted. Last, the comparative dynamics predictions of the model are related to stylized facts.
Toxvaerd, F. . (2004).
Time of the Essence.
Discussion Papers. presented at the 5. Retrieved from
/files/dp358.pdf Publisher's VersionAbstractIn most industries, ranging from information systems development to construction, an overwhelming proportion of projects are delayed beyond estimated completion time. This fact constitutes somewhat of a puzzle for existing theory. The present paper studies project delays and optimal contracts under moral hazard in a setting with time to build. Within this setup, project delays are found to be most likelyto happen at early stages of development, and intimately connected to the degree ofcommitment of the procurer and the class of contracts that can be enforced. The firstbest,optimal spot contracting and optimal long-term contract scenarios are analyzed, aswell as commonly encountered additional constraints on the long-term contract.
Zultan, C. S., & ˜i, R. . (2004).
Unilateral Face-to-Face Communication in Ultimatum Bargaining "A Video Experiment.
Discussion Papers. presented at the 9. Retrieved from
/files/dp369.pdf Publisher's VersionAbstractIt is commonly accepted that face-to-face communication induces cooperation. The experiment disentangles communication and social effect (replication of Roth, 1995) and examines the components of the social effect with the help of unilateral communication. Results suggest that separate processes, both of a strategic and of an affective-social nature may induce cooperative outcomes in ultimatum bargaining with pre-play communication, depending on the communication protocol. Unilateral communication is found to have weaker effects than bilateral communication, and affects especially the recipient of the communication.
Avishai, M. . (2004).
The Ethics of Memory.
Much of the intense current interest in collective memory concerns the politics of memory. In a book that asks, "Is there an ethics of memory?" Avishai Margalit addresses a separate, perhaps more pressing, set of concerns. The idea he pursues is that the past, connecting people to each other, makes possible the kinds of "thick" relations we can call truly ethical. Thick relations, he argues, are those that we have with family and friends, lovers and neighbors, our tribe and our nation--and they are all dependent on shared memories. But we also have "thin" relations with total strangers, people with whom we have nothing in common except our common humanity. A central idea of the ethics of memory is that when radical evil attacks our shared humanity, we ought as human beings to remember the victims. Margalit's work offers a philosophy for our time, when, in the wake of overwhelming atrocities, memory can seem more crippling than liberating, a force more for revenge than for reconciliation. Morally powerful, deeply learned, and elegantly written, The Ethics of Memory draws on the resources of millennia of Western philosophy and religion to provide us with healing ideas that will engage all of us who care about the nature of our relations to others.
