Reny, Motty Perry, and Philip J. “On The Failure Of The Linkage Principle In Multi-Unit Auctions”.
Discussion Papers 1997. Web.
Publisher's VersionAbstractIt is shown that the linkage principle (Milgrom and Weber(1982)) does not extend to the multi-unit auction setting. An analysis of the equilibium bidding strategies is carried out for the gneral two-agent/two-unit Vickrey auction in order to provide economic insight into the nature of the failure. In addition, an explicit counterexample is provided.
Samuel-Cahn, David Assaf, and Ester.
“Optimal Multivariate Stopping Rules”.
Discussion Papers 1997. Web.
Publisher's VersionAbstractFor fixed i let X(i)=(X1(i),...,Xd(i) be a d-dimensional random vector with some known joint distribution. Here i should be considered a time variable. Let X(i)=1,...,n be a sequence of n independent vectors, where n is the total horizon. In many examples Xj(i) can be thought of as the return to partner j, when there are d2 partners, and one stops with the i-th observation. If the j-th partner alone could decide on a (random) stopping rule t, his goal would be to maximize EXj(t) over all possible stopping rules tn. In the present "multivariate" setup the d partners must however cooperate and stop at the same stopping time t, so as to maximize some agreed upon function h( ) of the individual expected returns. The goal is thus to find a stopping rule t* for which h(EX1(t),...,EXd(t)=h(EX(t) is maximized. For continuous and monotone h we describe the class of optimal stopping rules t*. With some additional symmetry assumptions we show that the optimal rule is one which (also) maximizes EZt where Zi= Xj(i), and hence has a particularly simple structure. Examples are included, and the results are extended both to the infinite horizon case and to the case when X(1),..., X(n) are dependent. Asymptotic comparisons between the present problem of finding sup h(E X(t)) and the "classical" problem of finding sup Eh( X(t)) are given. Comparisons between the optimal return to the statistician and to a "prophet" are also included. In the present context a "prophet" is someone who can base his (random)choice g on the full sequence X(1),..., X(n), with corresponding return sup h(E X(g)).
Samuel-Cahn, Harold Sackrowitz, and Ester.
“P-Values As Random Variables; Expected P-Values”.
Discussion Papers 1997. Web.
Publisher's VersionAbstractP-values for hypotheses are considered as random variables. Their expected value (EPV) is expressed in a simple form. In simple examples they are directly computable, also under the alternative hypothesis, and in more complicated examples they are easily simulated. Their major advantage is that they do not depend on any significant level. It is suggested that the use of EPV can replace the use of power, which is always significance level dependent EPV can also be used for comparison of tests when more than one test is available for a given hypothesis. Examples are given, as well as tables which relate significance level and power to EPV. A comparison of the two-sample one-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Mann-Whitney and t tests is included, for a variety of underlying distributions.
Foster, Ilan Yaniv, and Dean.
“Precision And Accuracy Of Judgmental Estimation”.
Discussion Papers 1997. Web.
Publisher's VersionAbstractWhereas probabilistic calibration has been a central normative concept of accuracy in previous research on interval estimates, we suggest here that normative approaches for the evaluation of judgmental estimates should consider the communicative interaction between the individuals who produce the judgements and those who receive or use them for making decisions. We analyze precision and error in judgement and consider the role of accuracy-informativeness trade-off (Yaniv & Foster, 1995) in the communication of estimates. The results shed light on puzzling findings reported earlier in the literature concerning the calibration accuracy of subjective confidence intervals.
Solan, Eilon .
“Repeated Team Games With Absorbing States”.
Discussion Papers 1997. Web.
Publisher's VersionAbstractTwo teams meet every day to play the same matrix game. Every entry in the matrix contains five numbers: a payoff that each player in the first team receives whenever this entry is chosen, a similar payoff for the players of the second team, a probability that once this entry is chosen the game becomes "static", a payoff that each player in the first team receives in each future day if the game becomes "static" by this entry, and a similar payoff for the players of the second team.We prove that every such game has an equilibrium payoff.
Simon, Robert S. .
“Separation Of Joint Plan Equilibrium Payoffs From The Min-Max Functions”.
Discussion Papers 1997. Web.
Publisher's VersionAbstractThis article concerns infinitely repeated and un-discounted two-person non-zero-sum games of incomplete information on one side. Following the spirit of the Folk Theorem it establishes sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria with payoffs superior to what the players would receive from observable deviation. Examples are presented that show both the difficulty and the desirability for stronger results than those presented here.
Maschler, Daniel Granot, and Michael, Howlett.
“Spanning Network Games”.
Discussion Papers 1997. Web.
Publisher's VersionAbstractWe study fundamental properties of monotone network enterprises which contain public vertices and have positive and negative costs on edges and vertices. Among the properties studied are the nonemptiness of the core, characterization of nonredundent core constraints, ease of computation of the core and the nucleolus, and cases of decomposition of the core and the nucleolus.
Solan, Eilon .
“Stochastic Games With 2 Non-Absorbing States”.
Discussion Papers 1997. Web.
Publisher's VersionAbstractIn the present paper we consider recursive games that satisfy an absorbing property defined by Vieille. We give two sufficient conditions for existence of an equilibrium payoff in such a game, and prove that if the game has at most two non- absorbing states, then at least one of the conditions is satisfied. Using a reduction of Vieille, we conclude that every stochastic game which has at most two non-absorbing states has an equilibrium payoff.
Yaniv, Ilan .
“Weighting And Trimming: Heuristics For Aggregating Judgments Under Uncertainty”.
Discussion Papers 1997. Web.
Publisher's VersionAbstractIn making major decisions (e.g., about medical treatment, acceptance of manuscripts for publication, or investment), decision makers frequently poll the opinions and subjective estimates of other judges. The aggregation of these opinions is often beset by difficulties. First, decision makers often encounter conflicting subjective estimates. Second, estimates are often expressed with a measure of uncertainty. The decision maker thus needs to reconcile inconsistencies among judgmental estimates and determine their influence on the overall aggregate judgement. In the empirical studies, I examine the idea that weighting and trimming are two important heuristics in the aggregation of opinions under uncertainty. The results from these studies are contrasted with the findings of a normative study using a computer simulation that was designed to assess the objective effects of weighting and trimming operations on the accuracy of estimation.
Peleg, Werner Guth, and Bezalel.
“When Will Payoff Maximization Survive?”.
Discussion Papers 1997. Web.
Publisher's VersionAbstractSurvival of the fittest means that phenotypes behave as if they would maximize reproductive success. An indirect evolutionary analysis allows for stimuli which are not directly related to reproductive success although they affect behavior. One first determines the solution for all possible constelations of stimuli and then the evolutionarily stable stimuli. Our general analysis confirms the special results of former studies that survival of the fittest in case of commonly known stimuli requires either that own success does not depend on other's behavior or that other's behavbior is not influenced by own stimuli. When stimuli are private information one can derive similar necessary conditions for the survival of the fittest.