Citation:
Abstract:
{We provide an extension of the Condorcet Theorem. Our model includes both the Nitzan-Paroush framework of unequal competencies and Ladha s model of correlated voting by the jurors . We assume that the jurors behave informatively , that is, they do not make a strategic use of their information in voting. Formally, we consider a sequence of binary random variables X = (X1,X2, ...,Xn, ...) with range in 0,1 and a joint probability distribution P. The pair (X,P) is said to satisfy the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) if limn†’ˆ\v zP(ˆ‘Xi>n/2)=1. For a general (dependent) distribution P we provide necessary as well as sufficient conditions for the CJT. Let pi = E(Xi)