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Number Authour(s) Titlesort ascending Date Published in Abstract Paper
218 Daniel Granot, Michael Maschler & Jonathan Shalev Voting for Voters: The Unanimity Case (05/2000) International Journal of Game Theory 31 (2003), 155-202.

We present a simplified model of the evolution of a society which is regulated by a formal...

170 Salvador Barbera, Michael Maschler & Jonathan Shalev Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution (04/1998)

We model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are...

49 Eyal Winter Voting and Vetoing (06/1994) American Political Science Review 90 (1996), 813-823

The consequences of veto power in committees is analyzed using the approach of non-cooperative...

64 Jacob Glazer & Motty Perry Virtual Implementation in Backwards Induction (12/1994) Games and Economic Behavior 15 (1996), 27-32

We examine a sequential mechanism which is a simple modification of the normal form mechanism...

439 Rachel Arnon, Tamar Keasar, Dan Cohen and Avi Shmida Vertical Orientation and Color Contrast and Choices by Bumblebees (Bombus terrestris L.) (12/2006)

The vertical inflorescences of several plant species are terminated by colorful bracts, which...

89 Igal Milchtaich Vector Measure Games Based on Measures with Values in an Infinite Dimensional Vector Space (12/1995) Games and Economic Behavior 24 (1998), 25-46

The following generalization of a theorem of Aumann and Shapley is proved: A vector measure game...

458 Tamar Keasar, Adi Sadeh and Avi Shmida Variability in Nectar Production and Yield, and their Relation to Pollinator Visits, in a Mediterranean Shrub (07/2007) Arthropod Plant interactions 2 (2008), 117-123

Nectar yields (standing crops) in flowers within an individual plant are often highly variable....

234 Sergiu Hart Values of Perfectly Competitive Economies (01/2001) In R. J. Aumann & S. Hart (eds.) Handbook of Game Theory, with Economic Applications. (2002) Vol. III, Ch. 57, Elsevier/North-Holland

This chapter is devoted to the study of economic models with many agents, each of whom is...

602 Omer Edhan Values of Nondifferentiable Vector Measure Games (03/2012)

We introduce ideas and methods from distribution theory into value theory. This novel approach ...

183 Abraham Neyman Values of Non-Atomic Vector Measure Games (11/1998) Israel Journal of Mathematics 124 (2001), 1-27.

There is a value (of norm one) on the closed space of games that is generated by all games of...

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