Bargaining Sets of Majority Voting Games (revision of Discussion Paper #376)

Citation:

Ron Holzman, Bezalel Peleg, and Peter Sudholter. “Bargaining Sets Of Majority Voting Games (Revision Of Discussion Paper #376)”. Discussion Papers 2005. Web.

Abstract:

Let A be a finite set of m alternatives, let N be a finite set of n players and let RN be a profile of linear preference orderings on A of the players. Let uN be a profile of utility functions for RN. We define the NTU game VuN that corresponds to simple majority voting, and investigate its Aumann-Davis-Maschler and Mas-Colell bargaining sets. The first bargaining set is nonempty for m 3 and it may be empty for m ¥ 4. However, in a simple probabilistic model, for fixed m, the probability that the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set is nonempty tends to one if n tends to infinity. The Mas-Colell bargaining set is nonempty for m 5 and it may be empty for m ¥ 6. Furthermore, it may be empty even if we insist that n be odd, provided that m is sufficiently large. Nevertheless, we show that the Mas-Colell bargaining set of any simple majority voting game derived from the k-th replication of RN is nonempty, provided that k ¥ n + 2.

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