@booklet {ronholzman-bsomvgodp2005,
	title = {Bargaining Sets of Majority Voting Games (revision of Discussion Paper $\#$376)},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {2005},
	month = {11},
	publisher = {Mathematics of Operations Research 32 (2007), 857-872},
	abstract = {Let A be a finite set of m alternatives, let N be a finite set of n players and let RN be a profile of linear preference orderings on A of the players. Let uN be a profile of utility functions for RN. We define the NTU game VuN that corresponds to simple majority voting, and investigate its Aumann-Davis-Maschler and Mas-Colell bargaining sets. The first bargaining set is nonempty for m 3 and it may be empty for m {\textyen} 4. However, in a simple probabilistic model, for fixed m, the probability that the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set is nonempty tends to one if n tends to infinity. The Mas-Colell bargaining set is nonempty for m 5 and it may be empty for m {\textyen} 6. Furthermore, it may be empty even if we insist that n be odd, provided that m is sufficiently large. Nevertheless, we show that the Mas-Colell bargaining set of any simple majority voting game derived from the k-th replication of RN is nonempty, provided that k {\textyen} n + 2.},
	url = {/files/dp410.pdf},
	author = {Ron Holzman, Bezalel Peleg and Peter Sudholter}
}
