Citation:
Jens Leth Hougaard, B. P., & Thorlund-Petersen, L. . (1999). On the Set of Lorenz-Maximal Imputations in the Core of a Balanced Game. Discussion Papers. presented at the 11, International Journal of Game Theory 30(2001), 147-165. Retrieved from /files/ Peleg207.pdf
Abstract:
This paper considers the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced cooperative game as a solution concept. It is shown that the Lorenz-solution concept satisfies a number of suitable properties such as desirability, continuity and the reduced game property. Moreover, the paper considers alternative characterizations where it is shown that Lorenz-fairness is tantamount to the existence of an additive, strictly increasing and concave social welfare function. Finally the paper also provides axiomatic characterizations as well as two examples of application.