@booklet {jenslethhougaard-otsoliitcoabg1999,
	title = {On the Set of Lorenz-Maximal Imputations in the Core of a Balanced Game},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {1999},
	month = {11},
	publisher = {International Journal of Game Theory 30(2001), 147-165},
	abstract = {This paper considers the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced cooperative game as a solution concept. It is shown that the Lorenz-solution concept satisfies a number of suitable properties such as desirability, continuity and the reduced game property. Moreover, the paper considers alternative characterizations where it is shown that Lorenz-fairness is tantamount to the existence of an additive, strictly increasing and concave social welfare function. Finally the paper also provides axiomatic characterizations as well as two examples of application.},
	url = {/files/ Peleg207.pdf},
	author = {Jens Leth Hougaard, Bezalel Peleg and Lars Thorlund-Petersen}
}
