Citation:
Aumann, R. J. . (1995). Rationality and Bounded Rationality. Discussion Papers. presented at the 5, In S. Hart & A. Mas-Colell (eds.) Cooperation: Game Theoretic Approaches. Berlin: Springer (1997) 219-232; Also in Frontiers of Research in Economic Theory, The Nancy L. Schwartz Memorial Lectures, 1983-1997. Retrieved from '
Abstract:
A survey of bounded rationality models and ideas in Game Theory. Topics covered include: The evolutionary approach to optimization – and specifically to game theory – and its implications for the idea of bounded rationality; evolutionary dynamics; "rule rationality" as opposed to "act rationality"; "trembles" and refinements in general; "crazy" perturbations; failure of common knowledge of rationality; limiting average payoff in infinitelyrepeated games; epsilon equilibria; players modeled as computers, finite state automata, or Turing machines; paradoxes (such as Ellsberg or Allais); laboratory experiments; and finally, an open problem.