@booklet {aumann-rabr1995,
	title = {Rationality and Bounded Rationality},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {1995},
	month = {5},
	publisher = {In S. Hart \&amp; A. Mas-Colell (eds.) Cooperation: Game Theoretic Approaches. Berlin: Springer (1997) 219-232; Also in Frontiers of Research in Economic Theory, The Nancy L. Schwartz Memorial Lectures, 1983-1997},
	abstract = {A survey of bounded rationality models and ideas in Game Theory. Topics covered include: The evolutionary approach to optimization {\textendash} and specifically to game theory {\textendash} and its implications for the idea of bounded rationality; evolutionary dynamics; "rule rationality" as opposed to "act rationality"; "trembles" and refinements in general; "crazy" perturbations; failure of common knowledge of rationality; limiting average payoff in infinitelyrepeated games; epsilon equilibria; players modeled as computers, finite state automata, or Turing machines; paradoxes (such as Ellsberg or Allais); laboratory experiments; and finally, an open problem.},
	url = {{\textquoteright}},
	author = {Robert J. Aumann}
}
