Canonical Extensive Form of a Game Form: Part I - Symmetries, The

Citation:

Bezalel Peleg, J. R., & Sudholter, P. . (1998). Canonical Extensive Form of a Game Form: Part I - Symmetries, The. Discussion Papers. presented at the 12, In A. Alkan, C.D. Aliprantis & N.C. Yannelis (eds.), Current Trends in Economics: Theory and Applications (1999) Springer-Verlag 367-387. Retrieved from /files/dp186.pdf

Abstract:

Within this series of papers we plan to exhibit to any noncooperative game in strategic or normal form a 'canonical' representation in extensive form that preserves all symmetries of the game. The operation defined this way will respect the restriction of games to subgames and yield a minimal total rank of the tree involved. Moreover, by the above requirements the 'canonical extensive game form' will be uniquely defined. Part I is dealing with isomorphisms of game forms and games. An auto- morphism of the game is called motion. A symmetry of a game is a permuta- tion which can be augmented to a motion. Some results on the existence of symmetry groups are presented. The context to the notion of symmetry for coalitional games is exhibited.

Website