@booklet {bezalelpeleg-tcefoagfpi-s1998,
	title = {Canonical Extensive Form of a Game Form: Part I - Symmetries, The},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {1998},
	month = {12},
	publisher = {In A. Alkan, C.D. Aliprantis \&amp; N.C. Yannelis (eds.), Current Trends in Economics: Theory and Applications (1999) Springer-Verlag 367-387},
	abstract = {Within this series of papers we plan to exhibit to any noncooperative game in strategic or normal form a {\textquoteright}canonical{\textquoteright} representation in extensive form that preserves all symmetries of the game. The operation defined this way will respect the restriction of games to subgames and yield a minimal total rank of the tree involved. Moreover, by the above requirements the {\textquoteright}canonical extensive game form{\textquoteright} will be uniquely defined. Part I is dealing with isomorphisms of game forms and games. An auto- morphism of the game is called motion. A symmetry of a game is a permuta- tion which can be augmented to a motion. Some results on the existence of symmetry groups are presented. The context to the notion of symmetry for coalitional games is exhibited.},
	url = {/files/dp186.pdf},
	author = {Bezalel Peleg, Joachim Rosenmuller and Peter Sudholter}
}
