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פול גרייס הסביר כיצד הסקים משיח שונים מהסקים לוגיים מטיעונים. בפרט אפשר באמצעות תורתו להבין כיצד ניתן לרמות בלי לשקר. יש בכך כדי להאיר את עיסקת הטיעון של אריה דרעי. האם שיקר? האם רימה?
Maximizing the revenue from selling two or more goods has been shown to require the use of nonmonotonic mechanisms, where a higher-valuation buyer may pay less than a lower-valuation one. Here we show that the restriction to monotonic mechanisms may not just lower the revenue, but may in fact yield only a negligible fraction of the maximal revenue; more precisely, the revenue from monotonic mechanisms is no more than k times the simple revenue obtainable by selling the goods separately, or bundled (where k is the number of goods), whereas the maximal revenue may be arbitrarily larger. We then study the class of monotonic mechanisms and its subclass of allocation-monotonic mechanisms, and obtain useful characterizations and revenue bounds.