Abstract:

The environmental need to control the quality of the air is represented by a multi-players sequential game. One model is a two period game with n + 1 players, of which n are operators and one is an inspector. The game is analyzed via the solution concept of the strategies equilibrium (Nash equilibrium). The second model assumes that all operators are identical,i.e. the payoffs are the same to all operators. The equations that describe the Nash equilibrium, are solved analytically under this assumption, and enable us to compare games with a different number of operators (n). Numerical solutions are included. A discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of individual punishment vs. collective punishment appears in the last section. The model includes a parameter which varies from full individual punishment when the inspector raises an alarm (i.e. only the operators that acted illegally are fined), to full collective punishment (i.e. all operators are fined regardless their actions). Numerical results are added.

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