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Number Authour(s) Title Date Published insort descending Abstract Paper
388 Abba M. Krieger, Moshe Pollak and Ester Samuel-Cahn Select Sets: Rank and File (03/2005) Annals of Applied Probability 17 (2007), 360-385

In many situations, the decision maker observes items in sequence and needs to determine whether...

180 Robert Aumann & Werner Guth Species Survival and Evolutionary Stability in Sustainable Habitats: The Concept of Ecological Stability (06/1998) Journal of Evolutionary Economics 10 (2000), 437-447

Whover exists belongs to a species, which did not become extinct, has a (geno-)type, which...

57 Robert J. Aumann & Adam Brandenburger Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium (10/1994) Econometrica 63 (1995), 1161-1180

Sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium in an n-person game are given in terms of what the...

473 Micha Mandel and Yosef Rinott On Statistical Inference Under Selection Bias (12/2007) The American Statistician 63 211-217 (2009)

This note revisits the problem of selection bias, using a simple binomial example. It focuses on...

278 Gil Kalai, Ariel Rubinstein & Ran Spiegler Rationalizing Choice Functions by Multiple Rationales (11/2001) Econometrica 70 (2002), 2481-2488.

The paper presents a notion of rationalizing choice functions that violate the “Independence of...

101 Sergiu Hart & Benjamin Weiss Significance Levels for Multiple Tests (03/1996) Statistics and Probability Letters 35 (1997), 43-48

Let X1, ... , Xn be n random variables, with cumulative distribution functions F1, ... , Fn....

357 Flavio Toxvaerd A Theory of Optimal Deadlines (05/2004)

This paper sets forth a model of contracting for delivery in an environment with time to build...

323 Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters, and Ton Storcken Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences (07/2003) International Journal of Game Theory 33 (2005), 381-396

A game form constitutionally implements a social choice correspondence if it implements it in...

150 Robert S. Simon The Generation of Formulas Held in Common Knowledge (06/1997) International Journal of Game Theory 30 (2001), 1-18.

This ariticle concerns the interactive modal propositional calculus, using the multi-agent...

25 Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell Harsanyi Values of Large Economies: Non-Equivalence to Competitive Equilibria (02/1993) Games and Economic Behavior 13 (1996), 74-99

We consider the relations between the competitive equilibria in economies with many agents and...

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