# Publications

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Number | Authour(s) | Title | Date | Published in | Abstract | Paper |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

602 | Omer Edhan | Values of Nondifferentiable Vector Measure Games | (03/2012) |
We introduce ideas and methods from distribution theory into value theory. This novel approach ... |
dp602.pdf | |

234 | Sergiu Hart | Values of Perfectly Competitive Economies | (01/2001) | In R. J. Aumann & S. Hart (eds.) Handbook of Game Theory, with Economic Applications. (2002) Vol. III, Ch. 57, Elsevier/North-Holland |
This chapter is devoted to the study of economic models with many agents, each of whom is... |
val-hgt.html |

458 | Tamar Keasar, Adi Sadeh and Avi Shmida | Variability in Nectar Production and Yield, and their Relation to Pollinator Visits, in a Mediterranean Shrub | (07/2007) | Arthropod Plant interactions 2 (2008), 117-123 |
Nectar yields (standing crops) in flowers within an individual plant are often highly variable.... |
dp458.pdf |

89 | Igal Milchtaich | Vector Measure Games Based on Measures with Values in an Infinite Dimensional Vector Space | (12/1995) | Games and Economic Behavior 24 (1998), 25-46 |
The following generalization of a theorem of Aumann and Shapley is proved: A vector measure game... |
dp89.pdf |

439 | Rachel Arnon, Tamar Keasar, Dan Cohen and Avi Shmida | Vertical Orientation and Color Contrast and Choices by Bumblebees (Bombus terrestris L.) | (12/2006) |
The vertical inflorescences of several plant species are terminated by colorful bracts, which... |
dp439.pdf | |

64 | Jacob Glazer & Motty Perry | Virtual Implementation in Backwards Induction | (12/1994) | Games and Economic Behavior 15 (1996), 27-32 |
We examine a sequential mechanism which is a simple modification of the normal form mechanism... |
dp64.pdf |

49 | Eyal Winter | Voting and Vetoing | (06/1994) | American Political Science Review 90 (1996), 813-823 |
The consequences of veto power in committees is analyzed using the approach of non-cooperative... |
dp49.pdf |

170 | Salvador Barbera, Michael Maschler & Jonathan Shalev | Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution | (04/1998) |
We model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are... |
dp170.pdf | |

218 | Daniel Granot, Michael Maschler & Jonathan Shalev | Voting for Voters: The Unanimity Case | (05/2000) | International Journal of Game Theory 31 (2003), 155-202. |
We present a simplified model of the evolution of a society which is regulated by a formal... |
dp218.pdf |

428 | Robert J. Aumann | War and Peace | (08/2006) | Les Prix Nobel 2005 (forthcoming) |
Nobel Lecture. |
dp428.pdf |