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| Number | Authour(s) | Title |
Date |
Published in | Abstract | Paper |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10 | Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell | A Model of n-Person Non-Cooperative Bargaining | (07/1992) | Pubslied as "Bargaining and Value" in Econometrica 64 (1996), 357-380 |
We present and analyze a model of non-cooperative bargaining among n participants, applied to... |
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| 9 | Ezra Einy & Bezalel Peleg | Coalition-Proof Communication Equilibria | (07/1992) | Social Choice Welfare and Ethics, W.A. Barnet, H. Moulin, M. Salles & N.J. Schofield (eds.), Cambridge University Press (1995), 289-300 |
We offer a definition of coalition-proof communication equilibria. The use of games of... |
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| 8 | Sergiu Hart | On Prize Games | (05/1992) | Essays in Game Theory, N. Megiddo (ed.), Springer-Verlag (1994), 111-121 |
We consider the class of hyperplane coalition games (H-games): the feasible set of each... |
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| 7 | Eyal Winter | Mechanism Robustness in Multilateral Bargaining | (03/1992) | Theory and Decision 40 (1996), 131-147 |
We describe a non-cooperative bargaining model for games in coalition form without transferable... |
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| 6 | Nathan Linial | Games Computers Play: Game-Theoretic Aspects of Computing | (02/1992) | Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. II, R. J. Aumann & S. Hart (eds.), North-Holland (1994), 1340-1395 |
This is a survey of some connections between game theory and theoretical computer science. The... |
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| 5 | Jose-Luis Ferreira, Itzhak Gilboa, Michael Maschler | Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing during the Play | (02/1992) | Games and Economic Behavior 10 (1995), 284-317 |
Whenever one deals with an interactive decision situation of long duration, one has to take into... |
 dp5.pdf |
| 4 | Oscar Volij | Epistemic Conditions for Equilibrium in Beliefs without Independence | (01/1992) | Journal of Economic Theory 70 (1996), 391-406 |
Aumann and Brandenburger (1991) describe sufficient conditions on the knowledge of the players... |
dp4.pdf |
| 3 | Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell | A Non-Cooperative Interpretation of Value and Potential | (01/1992) | In R. Selten (ed.) Rational Interaction (1992) Springer-Verlag 83-93 |
Given a (TU or NTU) game in characteristic form an auxiliary two-person zero sum game is... |
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| 2 | Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell | Egalitarian Solutions of Large Games: II. The Asymptotic Approach | (01/1992) | Mathematics of Operations Research 20 (1995), 1003-1022 |
This is the second of two papers developing the theory of Egalitarian solutions for games in... |
