Publications
Advanced search
| Number | Authour(s) | Title |
Date |
Published in | Abstract | Paper |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 75 | Vijay Krishna & Robert W. Rosenthal | Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies | (03/1995) |
Motivated by recent auctions of licenses for the radio-frequency spectrum, we consider... |
 dp75.pdf |
|
| 74 | Daniel Rothenstein | A Two-Period Pollution Safeguards Game with n Operators | (03/1995) |
The environmental need to control the quality of the air is represented by a multi-players... |
||
| 76 | Robert J. Aumann | Rationality and Bounded Rationality | (05/1995) | In S. Hart & A. Mas-Colell (eds.) Cooperation: Game Theoretic Approaches. Berlin: Springer (1997) 219-232; also in Frontiers of Research in Economic Theory, The Nancy L. Schwartz Memorial Lectures, 1983-1997 |
A survey of bounded rationality models and ideas in Game Theory. Topics covered include: The... |
|
| 77 | Yaacov Z. Bergman, Bruce D. Grundy & Zvi Wiener | General Properties of Option Prices | (05/1995) | Journal of Finance 51 (1996), 1573-1610 |
This article establishes that, in a one-dimensional diffusion world, any contingent claim's... |
dp77.pdf |
| 69 | Abraham Neyman | Finitely Repeated Games with Finite Automata | (06/1995) | (revised in DP #161) |
The paper studies the implication of bounding the complexity of the strategies players may... |
dp69.pdf |
| 78 | Robert J. Aumann | Reply to Margalit and Yaari | (06/1995) | In K. J. Arrow, E. Colombatto, M. Perlman & C. Schmidt (eds.), The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior (1996), Macmillan, Basingstoke and London 106-107 |
A reply to Margalit and Yaari's paper "Rationality and Comprehension", in which they comment on... |
|
| 79 | Mathias Risse | A Syntactic Model of Forgetting: A Partially Solved Problem | (06/1995) |
We look at a set % of states of the world which are defined as maximal consistent lists of... |
||
| 82 | Abraham Neyman & Sylvain Sorin | Equilibria in Repeated Games of Incomplete Information: The Deterministic Symmetric Case | (07/1995) | In T. Parthasaraty et al. (eds.) Game-Theoretic Applications to Economics and Operations Research ( ) Kluwer Academic Press |
Every two person game of incomplete information in which the information to both players is... |
|
| 80 | Abraham Neyman | Correlated Equilibrium and Potential Games | (07/1995) | International Journal of Game Theory 26 (1997), 223-227 |
Any correlated equilibrium of a strategic game with bounded payoffs and convex strategy sets... |
|
| 81 | Daniel Granot & Michael Maschler | The Reactive Bargaining Set: Structure, Dynamics and Extension to NTU Games | (08/1995) | International Journal of Game Theory 26 (1997) 75-95. |
The reactive bargaining set (Granot [1994]) is the set of outcomes for which no justified... |
