Sunday Seminar | Miriam Schwartz-Ziv, When Shareholders Disagree

Sun, 06/11/202214:00-15:30



When Shareholders Disagree: Trading after Shareholder Meetings (joint work with Sophia Zhengzi Li and Ernst Maug)

This paper analyzes how trading after shareholder meetings changes the composition of the shareholder base. Analyzing daily trades, we find that mutual funds reduce their holdings if their votes are opposed to the voting outcome. Trading volume is high even when stock prices do not change, peaks on the meeting date, and remains high up to four weeks after shareholder meetings. The results support models based on differences of opinion that predict that shareholders’ beliefs may diverge more after observing voting outcomes. Hence, trading after meetings creates a more homogeneous shareholder base, which has important 
implications for corporate governance. 
For the full paper:


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