Game Theory and Mathematical Economics Research Seminar
Lecturer:
Dr. Shay Lavie (Tel Aviv University)
Title:
Pre-trial bargaining.
Abstract:
The vast majority of legal cases settle before trial, but those who do not settle inflict substantial costs on the judiciary. Accordingly, rich literature has modeled pre-trial bargaining, attempting to analyze the reasons for which parties fail to settle. I will briefly presentthe main insights of this literature, focusing on litigants’ divergent expectations and informational gaps as the main sources of settlement failures; and the conceptual difficulties that these explanations entail.
I will then proceed to show that the addition of a third-party, judge, enriches and complicates the typical description of pre-trial bargain. On the one hand, judges could impose on litigants a certain bargaining protocol, in order to facilitate socially useful goals. On the other hand, parties who desire to settle could negotiate the relevant terms with the judge. I will present previous and in-progress works along these lines.
Location:
Eilan Hall, Feldman Building, Second Floor, Edmond Safra Campus.