Game Theory and Mathematical Economics Research Seminar
Lecturer:
Prof. Michael Beenstock
Title:
The Battle between the Branches: Positive and Normative Theories of Judicial Review
Abstract:
A formal theoretical model is proposed to analyze the tension between the legislative and judicial branches when Supreme Courts undertake judicial review. The Government designs its legislative program in the public interest, but it dislikes confrontation over judicial review. Supreme Court justices have discretion in undertaking judicial review, but they dislike confrontation induced by activism. Legislators may curb the judiciary through override and related action.
In the positive theory of judicial review, both branches internalize the behavior of the other, resulting in a 'regulator game' in which activism and curbing are socially sub-optimal relative to the normative theory.
In the normative theory, the two branches cooperate instead of pursuing their private interests. Whereas in the positive theory neither branch trades off defending the constitution with promoting legislation, in the normative theory they trade off these objectives to maximize social welfare.
Location:
Eilan Hall, Feldman Building, Second Floor, Edmond Safra Campus.