Game Theory and Mathematical Economics Research Seminar
Lecturer:
Prof. Eilon Solan (Tel Aviv University)
Title:
Sunspot Equilibrium in Stochastic Games
Abstract:
It is well known that in stochastic games with finitely many players, states, and actions, equilibria in the finite horizon game and in the discounted game exist. However, these equilibria are sensitive to the length of the game or the discount factor. A strategy profile is a uniform approximate equilibrium if it is an approximate equilibrium in all finite games with a sufficiently long horizon, in all discounted games in which the players are sufficiently patient, and in the undiscounted game. The existence of such an equilibrium is known for two-player stochastic games and for some specific families of multiplayer stochastic games.
I will discuss recent results on the existence of a uniform approximate equilibrium in the presence of a public correlation device.
Location:
Eilan Hall, Feldman Building, Second Floor, Edmond Safra Campus.