Game Theory and Mathematical Economics Research Seminar
Lecturer:
Dima Shaiderman (Technion)
Title:
Markovian Persuasion
Abstract:
In the classical Bayesian persuasion model, an informed player and an uninformed one engage in a static interaction. This work extends the classical Bayesian persuasion model to a dynamic setting where the state of nature evolves according to a Markovian law, allowing for amore realistic representation of real-world situations where the state of nature evolves over time. In this repeated persuasion model, an optimal disclosure strategy of the sender must balance between obtaining a high-stage payoff and disclosing information that may have negative implications on future payoffs. We discuss optimal strategies under different discount factors and characterize when the asymptotic value achieves the maximal possible value.
Location:
Eilan Hall, Feldman Building, Second Floor, Edmond Safra Campus.