EconCS Seminar

 

Lecturer: 

Shiri Ron (Weizmann)

Title: 

The Trivial Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanism Is Optimal

Abstract: 

In this talk, we explore the approximation power of obviously strategy-proof auctions. Obvious strategy-proofness, introduced by Li [AER '17], strengthens the concept of dominant-strategy mechanisms. Intuitively, it ensures that even agents who struggle with contingent reasoning can identify their dominant strategy. 

For m items and n bidders, an ascending auction on the grand bundle is obviously strategy-proof and provides a min{m,n} approximation. We show that this simple mechanism is optimal: no obviously strategy-proof mechanism can achieve a better approximation than min⁡{m,n}, even for simple valuation classes such as additive and unit-demand.

Location: 

Room 130, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus.

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