EconCS Seminar

 

Lecturer: 

Prof. Ran Canetti (Boston University)

Title: 

Zero Knowledge Mechanisms

Abstract: 

Irrevocably commit to the rules of a mechanism is a basic tenet of  mechanism design:  it enables  players to verify incentive properties in advance and the outcome in retrospect. However,  commitment via public declaration of the detailed mechanism can reveal superfluous information that the mechanism designer prefers not to disclose, such as her target function or private costs.

We propose a new way of  committing to a mechanism, whereby players  can still verify incentive properties and outcomes as usual,  but  where the mechanism remains otherwise hidden throughout. Our approach  is based on cryptographic commitments and zero-knowledge proofs, and  does not involve any trusted third parties. Applications include non-mediated bargaining with hidden yet binding offers.

Joint work with Amos Fiat and Yannai Gonczarowski

Location: 

Room 130, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus.

 

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