EconCS Seminar

 

Lecturer: 

Maya Schlesinger (Tel Aviv University)

Title: 

Contracts with Combinatorial Actions

Abstract: 

We study contract design in combinatorial settings, where the agent can take multiple actions. We discuss the simultaneous multi-action model presented in [Duetting Ezra Feldman Kesselheim FOCS’21] and a new model where the agent takes actions sequentially, possibly adapting to previous outcomes.
For the simultaneous-action model, we present hardness of approximation results for submodular  and XOS success probability functions, the former of which resolves an open question from [DEFK 21] . For the sequential model, we show that the agent’s best response is closely related to the Pandora’s Box problem. Using this observation, we establish algorithms and hardness results under both independent and correlated actions. For independent actions, we show that the optimal linear contract can be computed in polynomial time, and the same holds for the optimal arbitrary contract when the number of outcomes is a constant. For correlated actions we find that approximating the optimal contract within any constant ratio is NP-hard.

Location: 

Room 130, Feldman Building, Edmond J. Safra Campus.

 

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