Michael Maschler Jose-Luis Ferreira, Itzhak Gilboa. 1992. “Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing during the Play”. Abstract
Whenever one deals with an interactive decision situation of long duration, one has to take into account that priorities of the participants 5 change during the conflict. In this paper we propose an extensive-form game model to handle such situations and suggest and study a solution concept, called credible equilibrium, which generalizes the concept of Nash equilibrium. We also discuss possible variants to this concept and applications of the model to other types of games.
This is the second of two papers developing the theory of Egalitarian solutions for games in coalitional form with non-transferable utility (NTU) and a large number of players. This paper is devoted to the study of the egalitarian solutions of finite games as the number of players increases. We show that these converge to the egalitarian solution of the limit game with a continuum of players as defined in our previous paper. The same convergence holds for the underlying potential functions.
Aumann and Brandenburger (1991) describe sufficient conditions on the knowledge of the players in a game for a Nash equilibrium to exist. They assumed, among other things, mutual knowledge of rationality. By rationality of a player, they mean that the action chosen by him maximizes his expected utility, given his beliefs. There is, however, no need to restrict the notion of rationality to expected utility maximization. This paper shows that their result can be generalized to the case where the players preferences over uncertain outcomes can be represented by a continuous function, not necessarily linear in the probabilities.
This is a survey of some connections between game theory and theoretical computer science. The main emphasis is on theories of fault-tolerant computing. The paper is largely self-contained.
We describe a non-cooperative bargaining model for games in coalition form without transferable utility. In this model random moves determine the order by which the players take their actions. the specific assignment of probability distributions to these chance moves is called the mechanics of the bargaining. Within this framework we examine the relation between the property of mechanism robustness, and coalition stability of the bargaining outcome, by showing that these two properties boil down to be the same.
Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell. 1992. “A Model of n-Person Non-Cooperative Bargaining”. Abstract
We present and analyze a model of non-cooperative bargaining among n participants, applied to games in cooperative form. This leads to a unified theory that has as special cases the Shapley value solution in the transferable utility case; the Nash bargaining solution in the pure bargaining case; and finally, the recently introduced Maschler-Owen consistent value solution in the general (non-transferable utility) case.
Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell. 1992. “A Non-Cooperative Interpretation of Value and Potential”. Abstract
Given a (TU or NTU) game in characteristic form an auxiliary two-person zero sum game is presented whose maximin = minimax value is precisely the potential of the game. In the auxiliary game one of the players tries to buy off the members of the original game by choosing the order in which to approach them, while the other player sets the price of those members so as to make the expense incurred as high as possible.
Sergiu Hart. 1992. “On Prize Games”. Abstract
We consider the class of hyperplane coalition games (H-games): the feasible set of each coalition is a half-space, with a slope that 5 vary from one coalition to another. H-games have turned out in various approaches to the value of general non-transferable utility (NTU) games. In this paper we introduce a simple model – prize games – that generates the hyperplane games. next, we provide an axiomatization for the Maschler & Owen (1989) consistent value of H-games.