@booklet {toxvaerd-atood2004,
	title = {A Theory of Optimal Deadlines},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {2004},
	month = {5},
	abstract = {This paper sets forth a model of contracting for delivery in an environment with time to build and adverse selection. The optimal contract is derived and characterized and it takes the form of a deadline contract. Such a contract stipulates a deadline for delivery for each possible type of agent efficiency. The optimal contract induces inefficient delay by using delivery time as a screening device. Furthermore, rents are decreasing in the agent{\textquoteright}s efficiency. In meeting the deadline, the agent{\textquoteright}s effort is strictly increasing over time, due to discounting. It is shown that increasing the project{\textquoteright}s gross value decreases delivery time, while the scale or difficulty of the project decreases it. Last, it is shown that the agent{\textquoteright}s rents are increasing in both project difficulty and gross project value.},
	url = {/files/dp357.pdf},
	author = {Flavio Toxvaerd}
}
