@booklet {lev-atporm2010,
	title = {A Two-Dimensional Problem of Revenue Maximization},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {2010},
	month = {4},
	abstract = {We consider the problem of finding the mechanism that maximizes the revenue of a seller of multiple objects. This problem turns out to be significantly more complex than the case where there is only a single object (which was solved by Myerson [5]). The analysis is difficult even in the simplest case studied here, where there are two exclusive objects and a single buyer, with valuations uniformly distributed on triangular domains. We show that the optimal mechanisms are piecewise linear with either 2 or 3 pieces, and obtain explicit formulas for most cases of interest},
	url = {/files/dp542.pdf},
	author = {Omer Lev}
}
