@booklet {agastya-aebmodp1994,
	title = {An Evolutionary Bargaining Model (revision of Discussion Paper $\#$38)},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {1994},
	month = {12},
	abstract = {A non-negative function f defined on the class of subsets of a finite set of factors of production describes the production possibilities at each date. The problem of allocating the surplus among the factors is studied in a dynamic learning model. Representatives for the factors (called players) make wage demands naively based on precedent and ignorant of each others{\textquoteright} utilities for this good. A global convergence result shows that players learn to reach some (and only a) core allocation in the long run. If players make mistakes however, only a strict subset of the core allocations are likely, i.e., stochastically stable. The main result shows that in the limit, these stable allocations for a particular set of players, converge to the allocation that maximizes the product of all the players{\textquoteright} utilities over core allocations.},
	url = {/files/dp61.pdf},
	author = {Murali Agastya}
}
