@booklet {galinoti-aeeobbiaa2014,
	title = {An Experimental Evaluation of Bidders{\textquoteright} Behavior in Ad Auctions},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {2014},
	month = {12},
	publisher = {WWW {\textquoteright}14 Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on World Wide Web, Pages 619-630},
	abstract = {We performed controlled experiments of human participants in a continuous sequence of ad auctions, similar to those used by Internet companies. The goal of the research was to understand users{\textquoteright} strategies in making bids. We studied the behavior under two auction types: (1) the Generalized Second-Price (GSP) auction and (2) the Vickrey{\textendash}Clarke{\textendash}Groves (VCG) payment rule, and manipulated also the participants{\textquoteright} knowledge conditions: (1) explicitly given valuations and (2) payoff information from which valuations could be deduced. We found several interesting behaviors, among them are: - No convergence to equilibrium was detected; moreover the frequency with which participants modified their bids increased with time. - We can detect explicit "better-response" behavior rather than just mixed bidding. - While bidders in GSP auctions do strategically shade their bids, they tend to bid higher than theoretically predicted by the standard VCG-like equilibrium of GSP. - Bidders who are not explicitly given their valuations but can only deduce them from their gains behave a little less "precisely" than those with such explicit knowledge, but mostly during an initial learning phase. - VCG and GSP yield approximately the same (high) social welfare, but GSP tends to give higher revenue.},
	url = {/files/dp676.pdf},
	author = {Gali Noti, Noam Nisan, Ilan Yaniv}
}
