@booklet {feinberg-aicsfavgcbs1995,
	title = {An Incomplete Cooperation Structure for a Voting Game Can Be Stable},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {1995},
	month = {11},
	publisher = {Games and Economic Behavior 24 (1998), 2-9},
	abstract = {Aumann and Myerson (1988) defined a linking game leading to the formation of cooperation structures. They asked whether it is possible for a simple game to have a stable structure in which no coalition forms, i.e., in which the cooperation graph is not internally complete. We answer this question affirmatively; specifically, we present a simple proper weighted majority game with a connected incomplete structure, and prove it to be stable.},
	url = {/files/dp85.pdf},
	author = {Yossi Feinberg}
}
