@booklet {fabriziogermano-akorace2012,
	title = {Approximate Knowledge of Rationality and Correlated Equilibria},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {2012},
	month = {6},
	abstract = {We extend Aumann{\textquoteright}s theorem (Aumann, 1987) in deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of~common priors and common knowledge of rationality by explicitly allowing for non-rational~behavior. We replace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weakernotion, p-belief of rationality, where agents believe the other agents are rational with~probabilities p or more. We show that behavior in this case constitutes a constrained correlated~equilibrium of a doubled game satisfying certain p-belief constraints and characterize the~topological structure of the resulting set of p-rational outcomes. We establish continuity in the~parameters p and show that, for p sufficiently close to one, the p-rational outcomes are close to~the correlated equilibria and, with high probability, supported on strategies that survive the~iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Finally, we extend Aumann and Dreze{\textquoteright}s~theorem (Aumann and Dreze, 2008) on rational expectations of interim types to the broader~p-rational belief systems, and also discuss the case of non-common priors.},
	url = {/files/dp610.pdf},
	author = {Fabrizio Germano , Peio Zuazo-Garin}
}
