@booklet {winter-bic1992,
	title = {Bargaining in Committees},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {1992},
	month = {12},
	publisher = {Published as \&quot;Negotiations in Multi-Issue Committees\&quot;, Journal of Public Economics 65 (1997), 323-342},
	abstract = {We propose a non-cooperative treatment to the problem of collective decision making within committees, by modelling this process as a sequential bargaining game. We show that stationary subgame perfect equilibria of this bargaining game fully implements the core of the corresponding committee problem. We also discuss the inefficiency of non-stationary (subgame perfect) equilibria, and shortly refer to the problem of manipulability. Based on these results we then consider multi-issue committees, and address the problem of constructing agendas. In particular we will argue in favor of agendas where the important issues are discussed first.},
	url = {{\textquoteright}},
	author = {Winter, Eyal}
}
