@booklet {hellman-bsscircg2009,
	title = {Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Repeated Cooperative Games},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {2009},
	month = {10},
	abstract = {This paper is concerned with the question of extending the definition of the bargaining set, a cooperative game solution, when cooperation takes place in a repeated setting. The focus is on situations in which the players face (finite or infinite) sequences of exogenously specified TU-games and receive sequences of imputations against those static cooperative games in each time period. Two alternative definitions of what a {\textquoteleft}sequence of coalitions{\textquoteright} means in such a context are considered, in respect to which the concept of a repeated game bargaining set may be defined, and existence and non-existence results are studied. A solution concept we term subgame-perfect bargaining set sequences is also defined, and sufficient conditions are given for the nonemptiness of subgame-perfect solutions in the case of a finite number of time periods.},
	url = {/files/dp523.pdf},
	author = {Ziv Hellman}
}
