@booklet {babichenko-bdilag2012,
	title = {Best-Reply Dynamics in Large Anonymous Games},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {2012},
	month = {3},
	abstract = {We consider small-influence anonymous games with a large number of players $n$ where every player has two actions. For this class of games we present a best-reply dynamic with the following two properties. First, the dynamic reaches Nash approximate equilibria fast (in at most $cn log n$ steps for some constant $c>0$). Second, Nash approximate equilibria are played by the dynamic with a limit frequency of at least $1-e^-c{\textquoteright}n$ for some constant $c{\textquoteright}>0$.},
	url = {/files/dp600.pdf},
	author = {Yakov Babichenko}
}
