@booklet {winter-tcfdswicmdds2011,
	title = {Case for Discriminatory Sentencing: Why Identical Crimes May Deserve Different Sanctions, The},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {2011},
	month = {3},
	abstract = {The traditional premise of criminal law is that criminals who are convicted of similar crimes under similar circumstances ought to be subject to identical sentences. This article~provides an efficiency-based rationale for discriminatory sentencing, i.e., establishes~circumstances under which identical crimes ought to be subject to differential sentencing. We also~establish the relevance of this finding to the practices of sentencing and, in particular, to the~Sentencing Guidelines. Most significantly, we establish that the model can explain why~celebrities, leaders, or recidivists ought to be subject to harsher sanctions than others.~Discriminatory sentencing is optimal when criminals confer positive externalities on each other.~If a criminal A who imposes (non-reciprocal) large positive externalities on criminal B is~punished sufficiently harshly, B would expect A not to commit the crime and consequently, he~would expect not to benefit from the positive externalities conferred on him by A. Given that B{\textquoteright}s~expected benefits are lower, the sanctions sufficient to deter B are also lower than the ones~imposed on A. The result can be easily extended to the case of reciprocal externalities. Assume~that a criminal A imposes positive externalities on B and B imposes identical positive~externalities on A. If A is subject to a sufficiently harsh sanction and B knows this, B would~expect A not to perform the crime and therefore would expect not to benefit from the positive~externalities otherwise conferred on B. Consequently, a more lenient sanction than the sanction~imposed on A would be sufficient to deter B.},
	url = {/files/dp569.pdf},
	author = {Winter, Alon Harel and Eyal}
}
