@booklet {gossner-cois1996,
	title = {Comparison of Information Structures},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {1996},
	month = {9},
	publisher = {Games and Economic Behavior 30 (2000), 44-63.},
	abstract = {We introduce two ways of comparing two information structures, say I and J. First, I is richer than J when for every compact game G, all correlated equilibrium distributions of G induced by J are also induced by I. Second, J is faithfully reproducible from I when all the players can compute from their information in the I "new information" that reproduces what they could have from J. We prove that I is richer than J if and only if J is faithfully reproducible from I.},
	url = {/files/dp116.pdf},
	author = {Olivier Gossner}
}
