@booklet {babichenko-cudane2010,
	title = {Completely Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibria},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {2010},
	month = {1},
	abstract = {A completely uncoupled dynamic is a repeated play of a game, where each period every player knows only his action set and the history of his own past actions and payoffs. One main result is that there exist no completely uncoupled dynamics with finite memory that lead to pure Nash equilibria (PNE) in almost all games possessing pure Nash equilibria. By "leading to PNE" we mean that the frequency of time periods at which some PNE is played converges to 1 almost surely. Another main result is that this is not the case when PNE is replaced by "Nash epsilon-equilibria": we exhibit a completely uncoupled dynamic with finite memory such that from some time on a Nash epsion-equilibrium is played almost surely.},
	url = {/files/dp529.pdf},
	author = {Yakov Babichenko}
}
