@booklet {tijs-tcpfgisf1992,
	title = {Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Form, The},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {1992},
	month = {11},
	publisher = {International Journal of Game Theory 25 (1996), 13-34},
	abstract = {We start with giving an axiomatic characterization of the Nash equilibrium (NE) correspondence in terms of consistency, converse consistency, and one-person rationality. Then axiomatizations are given of the strong NE correspondence, the coalition proof NE correspondence and the semi-strong NE. In all these characterizations consistency and suitable variants of converse consistency play a role. Finally, the dominant NE correspondence is characterized. We also indicate how to generalize our results to Bayesian and extensive games.},
	url = {{\textquoteright}},
	author = {Tijs, Bezalel Peleg and Stef}
}
