@booklet {neyman-citrpdwtnosinck1995,
	title = {Cooperation in the Repeated Prisoners{\textquoteright} Dilemma When the Number of Stages Is Not Commonly Known},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {1995},
	month = {1},
	publisher = {(revised indp $\#$162)},
	abstract = {It has often been observed that cooperative behavior emerges in actual play of the repeated prisoners{\textquoteright} dilemma. This observation seems to be in conflict with the fact that, in any finite repetition of the prisoners{\textquoteright} dilemma, all Nash equilibria (and even all correlated equilibria) lead to the non-cooperative outcome in each stage. In this paper we show that a very small departure from the common knowledge assumption on the number, T, of repetitions already enables cooperation. More generally, with such a departure, any feasible individually-rational outcome of any one-shot game can be approximated by a Nash equilibrium of a finitely-repeated version of that game. The sense in which the departure from common knowledge is "small" is as follows: (i) With probability one, the players know T with precision +- 1. (ii) With probability 1 - \%, the players know T precisely; moreover, this knowledge is mutual to degree \%T. (iii) the deviation of T from its expectation is extremely small.},
	url = {{\textquoteright}},
	author = {Abraham Neyman}
}
