@booklet {winter-ciairtsfc1992,
	title = {Core Implementation and Increasing Returns to Scale for Cooperation},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {1992},
	month = {12},
	publisher = {Journal of Mathematical Economics 23 (1994), 533-548},
	abstract = {In this paper we analyze a simple non-cooperative bargaining model for coalition formation and payoff distribution in games with coalition form. We show that under our bargaining regime a cooperative game is core implementable if and only if it possesses the property of increasing returns to scale for cooperation. Namely, the game is convex. This offers a characterization of a purely cooperative notion by means of its non-cooperative foundations.},
	url = {{\textquoteright}},
	author = {Winter, Benny Moldovanu and Eyal}
}
