@booklet {brandenburger-ecfne1994,
	title = {Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {1994},
	month = {10},
	publisher = {Econometrica 63 (1995), 1161-1180},
	abstract = {Sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium in an n-person game are given in terms of what the players know and believe - about the game, and about each other{\textquoteright}s rationality, actions, knowledge, and beliefs. Mixed strategies are treated not as conscious randomizations, but as conjectures, on the part of other players, as to what a player will do. Common knowledge plays a smaller role in characterizing Nash equilibrium than had been supposed. When n = 2, mutual knowledge of the payoff functions, of rationality, and of the conjectures implies that the conjectures form a Nash equilibrium. When n \% 3 and there is a common prior, mutual knowledge of the payoff functions and of rationality, and common knowledge of the conjectures, imply that the conjectures form a Nash equilibrium. Examples show the results to be tight.},
	url = {/files/dp57.pdf},
	author = {Brandenburger, Robert J. Aumann and Adam, Ori et al,}
}
