@booklet {wexler-edflpigwmbie2005,
	title = {Evolutionary Dynamics for Large Populations in Games with Multiple Backward Induction Equilibria},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {2005},
	month = {9},
	abstract = {This work follows "Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction" (Hart [2000]) in the study of dynamic models consisting of selection and mutation, when the mutation rate is low and the populations are large. Under the assumption that there is a single backward induction (or subgame perfect) equilibrium of a perfect information game, Hart [2000] proved that this point is the only stable state. In this work, we examine the case where there are multiple backward induction equilibria.},
	url = {/files/dp402.pdf},
	author = {Tomer Wexler}
}
