@booklet {neyman-eoosimgwii2005,
	title = {Existence of Optimal Strategies in Markov Games with Incomplete Information},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {2005},
	month = {12},
	abstract = {The existence of a value and optimal strategies is proved for the class of two-person repeated games where the state follows a Markov chain independently of players{\textquoteright} actions and at the beginning of each stage only player one is informed about the state. The results apply to the case of standard signaling where players{\textquoteright} stage actions are observable, as well as to the model with general signals provided that player one has a nonrevealing repeated game strategy. The proofs reduce the analysis of these repeated games to that of classical repeated games with incomplete information on one side.},
	url = {/files/dp413.pdf},
	author = {Abraham Neyman}
}
