@booklet {solan-ece1998,
	title = {Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibria},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {1998},
	month = {6},
	abstract = {The paper studies extensive-form correlated equilibria in stochastic games. An extensive-form correlated equilibrium is an equilibrium in an extended game, where a correlation device chooses at every stage, as a function of past signals (but independently of the actions of the players) a private signal for each player. We define the notion of individually rational payoffs for these games, and characterize the set of extensive-form correlated equilibrium payoffs using feasible and individually rational payoffs. Our result implies that extensive-form correlated equilibria and communication equilibria are payoff-equivalent in our model.},
	url = {/files/dp175.pdf},
	author = {Eilon Solan}
}
