@booklet {neyman-frgwfaodp1997,
	title = {Finitely Repeated Games with Finite Automata (revision of Discussion Paper $\#$69)},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {1997},
	month = {9},
	publisher = {Mathematics of Operations Research 23 (1998), 513-552.},
	abstract = {{The paper studies the implications of bounding the complexity of the strategies players may select, on the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games. The complexity of a strategy is measured by the size of the minimal automaton that can implement it. A finite automaton has a finite number of states and an initial state. It prescribes the action to be taken as a function of the current state and a transition function changing the state of the automaton as a function of its current state and the present actions of the other players. The size of an automaton is its number of states. The main results imply in particular that in two person repeated games, the set of equilibrium payoffs of a sequence of such games. G(n)},
	url = {/files/dp161.pdf},
	author = {Abraham Neyman}
}
