@booklet {sergiuhart-hgasmfsmg2014,
	title = {How Good Are Simple Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods?},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {2014},
	month = {5},
	abstract = {Maximizing the revenue from selling two goods (or items) is a notoriously difficult problem, in stark contrast to the single-good case. We show that simple "one-dimensional" mechanisms, such as selling the two goods separately, guarantee at least 73\% of the optimal revenue when the valuations of the two goods are independent and identically distributed, and at least 50\% when they are independent. However, in the general case where the valuations may be correlated, simple mechanisms cannot guarantee any positive fraction of the optimal revenue. We also introduce a "measure of complexity" for mechanisms{\textendash}-the menu size{\textendash}-and show that it is naturally related to the fraction of the optimal revenue that can be guaranteed.},
	url = {http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/hart/abs/m-simple.html},
	author = {Sergiu Hart, Noam Nisan}
}
