@booklet {young-lwhb1996,
	title = {Learning with Hazy Beliefs},
	howpublished = {Discussion Papers},
	year = {1996},
	month = {9},
	publisher = {Published As: \&quot;Learning, Hypothesis Testing, and Nash Equilibrium\&quot;, Games and Economic Behavior 25 (2003), 73-96.},
	abstract = {Players are rational if they always choose best replies given their beliefs. They are good predictors if the difference between their beliefs and the distribution of the other{\textquoteright}s actual strategies goes to zero over time. Learning is deterministic if beliefs are fully determined by the initial conditions and the observed data. (Bayesian updating is a particular example). If players are rational{\textquoteright} good predictors, and learn deterministically, there are many games for which neither beliefs nor actions converge to a Nash equilibrium. We introduce an alternative approach to learning called prospecting in which players are rational and good predictors, but beliefs have a small random component. In any finite game, and from any initial conditions, prospecting players learn to play arbitrarily close to Nash equilibrium with probability one.},
	url = {/files/db115.pdf},
	author = {Young, Dean P. Foster and H. Peyton}
}
